Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2013

Supreme Court Holds Grand Jury Witnesses Absolutely Immune
from § 1983 Liability
Martin Schwartz
Touro Law Center, mschwartz@tourolaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
27 Mun. Law. 5 (2013)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Supreme Court Holds Grand Jury Witnesses Absolutely
Immune from § 1983 Liability
By Martin A. Schwartz
Police officer perjury
is a terrible blight on the
criminal justice system. The
issue was recently explored
by Michelle Alexander in
her op-ed article in the New
York Times, “Why Police Lie
Under Oath.” The article
quoted former San Francisco Police Commissioner
Peter Keane’s disturbing
conclusion that “[p]olice officer perjury to justify illegal
dope searches is commonplace[,] a routine way of doing business in courtrooms everywhere in America.”1
The problem is neither limited to police perjury to
justify drug searches nor limited geographically. Ms.
Alexander found that New York City police officers
“engage in patterns of deceit in cases involving charges
as minor as trespass.”2
Police officer perjury compromises the integrity
of the criminal justice system, and can have serious
adverse consequences for criminal suspects and defendants, worst of all being wrongfully convicted and
serving time for a crime the defendant did not commit.
As Ms. Alexander so aptly put it, “[a]s a juror, whom
are you likely to believe: the alleged criminal in an
orange jumpsuit or two well-groomed police officers
in uniforms who just swore to God they’re telling the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but.”3
And yet, some three decades ago the United States
Supreme Court in Briscoe v. LaHue4 held that police officers are absolutely immune from claims for money
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly giving
perjurious testimony at a criminal trial. Although §
1983 authorizes the assertion of federal constitutional
claims against state and local officials, absolute immunity effectively deprives the § 1983 complainant of
a meaningful remedy. Last term, the Supreme Court
in Rehberg v. Paulk5 extended the absolute witness immunity recognized in Briscoe v. LaHue to grand jury
witnesses. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., the Court in Rehberg held that
grand jury witnesses are absolutely immune from §
1983 liability for their testimony, and even for conspiring to give false testimony.
Charles Rehberg, a CPA, sent anonymous faxes to
the management of a hospital in Georgia, criticizing the
hospital’s management and operations. The district attorney’s office then launched an investigation against

Rehberg, which, according to Rehberg, was undertaken
as a favor to hospital officials. Rehberg was indicted
in state court for, inter alia, assaulting a physician,
burglary, and making harassing telephone calls. After
all of the criminal charges were dismissed, Rehberg
brought suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 seeking money damages against James Paulk,
the chief investigator in the local district attorney’s
office, in his personal capacity. The complaint alleged
that Paulk conspired to present and presented false
testimony to the grand jury against Rehberg, causing
him to be indicted in violation of his constitutionally
protected rights.

“Police officer perjury compromises
the integrity of the criminal justice
system, and can have serious adverse
consequences for criminal suspects
and defendants, worst of all being
wrongfully convicted and serving time
for a crime the defendant did not
commit.”
Section 1983 claims are generally assertable against
state and local officials and municipalities,6 although
not against states or state entities.7 A § 1983 plaintiff
may seek money damages against a state or local official in her personal capacity based upon her allegedly
unconstitutional conduct.8 A personal-capacity claim
(also referred to as an individual-capacity claim) seeks
a judgment for money damages payable out of the official’s private funds. By contrast, an official-capacity
claim against an official is tantamount to a claim
against the governmental entity.9 For example, an official capacity claim against the Mayor of the City of
New York is tantamount to a claim against the City. Rehberg v. Paulk concerns only personal-capacity claims.
Although § 1983 makes no mention of immunity
from liability, United States Supreme Court precedent
firmly establishes that state and local officials sued for
money damages in their personal capacities may assert
an immunity defense.10 Some officials sued under §
1983 are entitled to assert an absolute immunity, while
others are entitled to assert qualified immunity. Generally speaking, officials who carry out judicial, prosecutorial and legislative functions are shielded by absolute
immunity, while officials who carry out law enforcement and other executive functions are protected by
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qualified immunity. As we will see, whether an official
is entitled to assert an absolute immunity or qualified
immunity depends on the nature of the function she
carried out.
Absolute immunity shields an official from monetary liability even if she acted in a blatantly unconstitutional manner, and even if she acted maliciously or
otherwise in bad faith.11 Qualified immunity provides
somewhat lesser protection, shielding an official from
personal liability so long as she did not violate clearly
established federal law.12 Nevertheless, qualified immunity is a quite formidable defense, just not as formidable as absolute immunity. The Supreme Court in
Rehberg v. Paulk had to decide whether Paulk’s grand
jury testimony, and his alleged participation in a conspiracy to give false testimony, were protected by absolute immunity. The Court held that Paulk was protected by absolute witness immunity for those actions.
The Court in Rehberg reiterated its approach for
determining whether an official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to an absolute or qualified immunity. Because it is assumed that Congress was familiar
with the common-law immunities in place when the
original version of § 1983 was enacted in 1871, the
Court first looks for “guidance” to those common
law immunities.13 In other words, the Court does not
simply make a ‘“freewheeling’” determination of
whether recognition of an immunity defense is sound
policy.14 On the other hand, the Court has not applied
the common law immunities “mechanically,” and has
considered both developments in the law since 1871 as
well as policy concerns underlying § 1983.15 The Court
in Rehberg gave the following example. In 1871, it was
common for criminal cases to be prosecuted by private
parties who did not enjoy absolute immunity.16 Since
1871, the great majority of criminal offenses have, of
course, been prosecuted by public prosecutors,17 and
common-law courts afforded them absolute immunity
from malicious prosecution and defamation claims.
Even though the common-law in 1871 did not afford
prosecutors absolute immunity, the Supreme Court
has afforded them absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for carrying out their advocacy functions. In
the seminal case of Imbler v. Pachtman,18 the Court held
that prosecutors are absolutely immune for initiating and prosecuting a criminal case. Since Imbler was
decided in 1976, an extensive body of Supreme Court
and circuit court decisional law, guided by commonlaw concepts as well as policy considerations, has
attempted to flesh out the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.19
The Court applies a “functional approach” under
which the immunity to which a § 1983 defendant is
entitled depends not upon the official’s title, but upon
the nature of the particular function at issue in the case
at hand.20 An official may thus be entitled to absolute
6

immunity for carrying out one function though qualified immunity for another. Prosecutors, for example,
enjoy absolute immunity for carrying out their advocacy functions, though qualified immunity for their
actions that are essentially investigatory or administrative in nature. The line between the two types of functions is sometimes difficult to discern.21
Although at common-law trial witnesses enjoyed
immunity only from slander and libel claims,22 in Briscoe v. LaHue,23 the Supreme Court recognized a much
broader absolute immunity for trial witnesses sued
under § 1983 that encompasses any constitutional claim
based on the witness’s testimony. The Court in Briscoe
held that a police officer who gave allegedly perjurious
testimony at a criminal trial was protected from § 1983
liability by absolute witness immunity. It reasoned that
police officers should not testify with the lurking fear
of monetary liability, and expressed concern that some
officers might shade their testimony in favor of a potential § 1983 claimant because of that fear.24 And, the
Court did not want police officers diverting their energies from their police responsibilities to the defense of
§ 1983 claims based upon their testimony in a criminal
trial.25 These are legitimate reasons supporting absolute immunity for the trial testimony of police officers.
The problem is that on the other side of the lawsuit
there may be a § 1983 plaintiff who suffered a serious
deprivation of constitutional rights because of perjurious police testimony, but is denied relief because of
absolute immunity.
Nevertheless, the Court in Rehberg v. Paulk extended the absolute witness immunity recognized in Briscoe
v. LaHue for trial testimony to law enforcement officer
witnesses who testify before the grand jury. The Court
found that the same justifications for granting absolute
immunity for trial witnesses apply to grand jury witnesses. “In both contexts, a witness’s fear of retaliatory
litigation may deprive the tribunal of critical evidence.
And, in neither context is the deterrent of potential
civil liability needed to prevent perjurious testimony,”
because in each instance perjury is subject to criminal
prosecution.26 The Court overlooked the reality that
perjury prosecutions are fairly uncommon.
The Court in Rehberg held that absolute immunity
protects not only the in-court testimony of grand jury
witnesses, but also witness preparation and even alleged conspiracies to give perjured testimony. The
Court was concerned that were the rule “otherwise ‘a
criminal defendant turned civil plaintiff could simply
reframe a claim to attack the preparation instead of
the absolutely immune actions themselves.’”27 In the
“vast majority” of claims against grand jury witnesses,
the witness and prosecutor engaged in preparatory
activity, such as preliminary discussions in which the
witness related the “substance of her intended testimony.”28 Failure to immunize an alleged conspiracy to
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give false testimony and trial preparation would thus
make it easy for § 1983 claimants to evade absolute
witness immunity. The extension of absolute immunity
to witness preparation and conspiracies effectively put
the Court’s “stamp of approval” on the majority view
in the circuits that absolute witness immunity encompasses witness preparation and conspiracies, and effectively overturned the Second Circuit’s minority view
that absolute witness immunity was limited to the testimony itself and did not encompass either conspiracies to give false testimony or witness preparation.29
The Court perhaps attempted to soften the immunity blow a bit with ambiguous footnote one, stating
that the extension of absolute immunity to conspiracies to give false testimony and witness preparation
“[o]f course does not mean that absolute immunity
extends to all activity engaged in by a witness outside
the grand jury room.”30 The Court offered as examples
decisions in which it has “accorded only qualified
immunity to law enforcement officials who falsify affidavits”31 and who “fabricate evidence concerning an
unsolved crime.”32
Brief ambiguous “of course” footnotes can “of
course” muddy the waters and cause great mischief.
Section 1983 plaintiffs’ attorneys will undoubtedly rely
on footnote one in their attempts to escape the clutches
of absolute immunity, while defendants’ counsel will
attempt to distinguish footnote one away. In the author’s view the footnote suggests that the officer’s
out-of-court conduct will not be protected by absolute
witness immunity if it was too far removed from her
in-court testimony. Of course, how far is too far, and
whether or not the officer’s conduct constitutes witness preparation, will have to be determined on a caseby-case basis.
In a final attempt to avoid the clutches of absolute immunity, Rehberg argued that Paulk was not
protected by absolute immunity because he was a
“complaining witness.” Rehberg relied upon Supreme
Court precedent to support the conclusion that law enforcement officials who submitted affidavits in support
of applications for arrest warrants were not entitled
to absolute immunity because they were “complaining
witnesses.”33 Prior to its decision in Rehberg v. Paulk,
the Court had not provided a workable definition of
“complaining witness.” Rehberg resolved that a grand
jury witness is not a “complaining witness” because at
common law in 1871 a “complaining witness” referred
to an individual who procured an arrest and initiated
a criminal prosecution;34 a witness who only testified
before a grand jury was not a complaining witness.
In fact, “it is almost always a prosecutor who is responsible for the decision to present a case to a grand
jury….”35 The term “complaining witness” is misleading, a “misnomer,” because a complaining witness
need not testify at all.36 The Court thus ruled that even

though a law enforcement officer who testifies before
the grand jury or at trial may be an important witness,
he is not a complaining witness.37
Most states that do not use the grand jury system
provide a preliminary hearing procedure.38 The Court
in Rehberg cited, with apparent approval, circuit court
decisions holding that witnesses at a preliminary hearing are entitled to the same absolute immunity granted
grand jury witnesses.39 Although this part of the
Court’s decision is dicta, it follows logically from the
rationale of the Court’s extension of absolute immunity
to grand jury testimony.
The Court’s decision in Rehberg v. Paulk does not
resolve the immunity to which other witnesses are entitled, for example, witnesses in civil litigation, before
administrative agencies, and in arbitration proceedings. One reason these issues do not arise with great
frequency in § 1983 litigation is because a suable § 1983
defendant must be a person who acted under color of
state law. Law enforcement officers who testify pursuant to their official responsibilities clearly act under
color of state law. Private witnesses clearly do not, unless they conspired with a public official.
The decision in Rehberg v. Paulk is strictly limited
to the issue of immunity from § 1983 liability enjoyed
by grand jury witnesses. The decision does not deal
with the type of conduct engaged in by law enforcement officials that may be actionable as a constitutional
wrong under § 1983. Nor did the Court deal in Rehberg
with the right of a § 1983 plaintiff to obtain disclosure
of grand jury testimony. Although the Court referred
to the importance of grand jury secrecy,40 and in passing stated that absolute witness immunity “may not
be circumvented…by using evidence of the witness’
testimony to support any other § 1983 claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution,”41
the Court did not decide when disclosure of grand jury
testimony may be ordered in a § 1983 action.42
To summarize the Supreme Court’s important rulings in Rehberg v. Paulk:
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1. Grand jury witnesses are protected by absolute
witness immunity;
2. Absolute witness immunity shields not only the
testimony itself, but also an alleged conspiracy
to give false testimony and trial preparation;
3. Via strong dictum, witnesses who testify at preliminary hearings are shielded by absolute witness immunity; and
4. Although “complaining witnesses” do not enjoy
absolute immunity, merely testifying before the
grand jury does not render a witness a “complaining witness.”
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